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BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
 
    Matthew D. Adler+  
 
 Any normative framework which has the structure of recommending that 
decisionmakers advance certain goals, and that they do so in accordance with decision 
theory (DT), runs into the problem of bounded rationality. The problem is how to refine 
DT so as to be usable by a bounded decisionmaker -- someone with limited cognitive 
resources, for whom the full evaluation of her choices is impossible or at least very 
expensive.   
 
 This chapter has two aims.  The first, pursued in Parts I and II, is to discuss the 
problem of bounded rationality in general terms. The second, pursued in Part III, is to 
show why the problem creates a gap at the foundations of legal scholarship.   In Fairness 
versus Welfare (FW), Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell propose a welfarist methodology 
for legal scholarship.1  They may be wrong to think that morality is wholly welfarist, but 
a normative program which says that social welfare is one of plurality of criteria by 
which legal scholars should evaluate laws and policies is very plausible.  But we have no 
good normative handle on how legal scholars who are bounded in their cognitive abilities 
should implement a welfarist or pluralistic program.  
  
I. THE PROBLEM OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY 
  
 The term “bounded rationality” is sometimes used by psychologists to describe or 
explain certain decisionmaking processes without endorsing or criticizing them.  By 
contrast, the problem of “bounded rationality” that I discuss in this chapter is normative. I 
am interested in the problem that human cognitive limits create for our attempts to flesh 
out normative frameworks.    
 
 A. Instrumentalist Normative Frameworks and Decision Theory 
 
A normative framework furnishes recommendations for some class of 
decisionmakers.   Some normative frameworks furnish moral recommendations, others 
non-moral recommendations (for example, recommendations concerning what the 
decisionmaker should do in light of her interests).  In either event, let us call a normative 
framework “instrumentalist” if it is oriented around goals.2  One such framework is 
                                                 
+ Leon Meltzer Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Thanks to Christoph Engel, Jeff 
Rachlinski, Adrian Vermeule, and Mark White for comments. 
1 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 2002, Fairness Versus Welfare, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
2 What exactly this means is a complicated question.  Within moral theory, that question has been 
extensively discussed with reference to the distinction between “consequentialist” and “non-
consequentialist” moral frameworks.  For purposes of this chapter, I don’t need to take a firm stand on the 
question. The crucial point is that some such frameworks, such as Humeanism, or welfarism or 
consequentialist moral frameworks more generally, are thus oriented and therefore naturally employ DT as 




“Humeanism,” which recommends to each individual that she pursue whatever 
preferences she happens to have.  Another is welfarism, a moral framework, which 
recommends that decisionmakers promote the goal of social welfare. 
 
 An instrumentalist normative framework will not be very helpful unless it 
furnishes procedural norms for the decisionmakers within its scope, explaining how they 
should go about implementing the stipulated goals.  Call these procedural norms the 
“procedural component” of the normative theory.  
 
 The argument I will be developing in the next two Parts is this: human cognitive 
limitations pose serious difficulties for using DT as the procedural component for an 
instrumentalist normative framework.   
 
 Understood as a set of procedural norms, DT enjoins the decisionmaker to think 
of any choice situation at some time t as an outcome set O = {o1, o2, …}, an action set A 
= {a1, a2, …}, and a state set S = {s1, s2, …}.3  An outcome is a normatively relevant 
description of some way the world might be -- a description in terms of the goals of the 
normative theory that DT is fleshing out.  Equivalently, an outcome is a proposition or a 
set of possible worlds.  Actions are what the decisionmaker can do at t.  
 
States, like outcomes, are propositions.  But, in a well-framed description of a 
choice situation, states are causally independent of actions -- it should not be possible for 
an action to cause a state4 -- and so each state is most naturally thought of as a possible 
past history of the world, together with causal laws. Further, in a well-framed choice 
situation, the states are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The 
decisionmaker does not know which state is the true one -- but one must be, only one can 
be, and the decisionmaker knows that.  Finally, there are necessary connections between 
the states, the actions, and the outcomes, which again the decisionmaker knows.  The 




How DT Conceptualizes a Choice Situation  
  
    States 
   s1  s2  s3 …  
   
                                                 
3 In my discussion of DT, I have relied heavily upon James M. Joyce, 1999, The Foundations of Causal 
Decision Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
4See Joyce, The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory; James M. Joyce & Allan Gibbard, 1998,”Causal 
Decision Theory,” in Salvador Barbera et al eds., Handbook of Utility Theory, Vol. 1, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
pp. 627-66. 
5 This formulation assumes that the decisionmaker gives zero probability to the possibility of 
indeterministic causal laws.  Refining DT for the possibility of indeterminism raises complicated issues that 
I cannot consider here.  See David Lewis, 1981, “Causal Decision Theory,” Australasian J. Philosophy, 69, 
pp. 5-30.  But it is hard to see why DT, thus refined, would not confront problems of bounded rationality 
similar to those discussed below.  
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  a1 o(a1, s1) o(a1, s2) o(a1, s3)    
            
Actions a2 o(a2, s1) o(a2, s2) o(a2, s3) 
 
  a3 o(a3, s1) o(a3, s2) o(a3, s3) 
  … 
Note: o(ai, sj) is the outcome in the outcome set O that would result if action ai were performed in state sj. 
   
 DT also enjoins the decisionmaker to follow certain norms in ranking outcomes 
and actions.  To begin, the decisionmaker is enjoined to have a complete and transitive 
ranking of the outcomes.  Another such norm is consequentialism: if, in each state, two 
actions produce the very same outcome, then the decisionmaker should be indifferent 
between the two actions.  Another is dominance: if one action produces no worse 
outcomes than a second action in all states, and better outcomes in some, then the first 
action must be ranked better.6  Yet another is independence:  If two actions produce the 
very same outcome o* in some state of the world s', the very same outcome o** in state 
s'', and so forth, and are ranked a certain way, then two actions which are identical to the 
first pair except that they produce o+ rather than o* in s', o++ rather than o** in s'', and 
so forth, should be ranked the same way as the first pair. 
   
 DT is sometimes offered, not as a set of procedural norms, but as a set of 
substantive criteria for normatively appropriate choice.7  In this guise, the theory takes an 
“as if” form. It is agnostic about the procedure decisionmaker actually uses, and instead 
says that -- whatever that procedure might be -- he should pick the choices which he 
would have selected, had he used DT as his procedure.  
 
 I don’t know whether DT, in its substantive version, runs afoul of human 
cognitive limits.  But, as already stated, any normative framework is incomplete if it 
lacks a procedural component.  How helpful will it be to state some goal for some agent, 
but not tell her what to do to implement the goal?  And DT, in its procedural form, clearly 
does run afoul of bounded rationality, as I will show in a moment. 
 
 But why even think, then, of using DT as the procedural component of a 
normative framework? The answer is that DT is far and away the best developed account 
of rational choice.  DT meshes particularly well with instrumentalist normative 
frameworks.  A goal is just a norm for identifying a set of outcomes that matter and 
ordering its elements.  DT then tells the agent how to orient his choices towards these 
outcomes, given uncertainty, in a plausible way: by thinking systematically about how his 
possible actions and possible prior states might interact to cause different outcomes.   
 
In addition, Leonard Savage showed that the choices of a decisionmaker who 
satisfies DT’s norms (and several other more technical axioms) can be represented as 
                                                 
6 More precisely, some of the states in which the first action produces better outcomes must be non-“null,” 
i.e., have positive probability. 
7 See Frederic Laville, 2000, “Foundations of Procedural Rationality: Cognitive Limits and Decision 
Processes,” Economics and Philosophy, 16, pp. 117-138. 
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maximizing the expectation of a utility function.8 There is some probability function 
assigning numerical probabilities to states, and some utility function assigning numerical 
utilities to outcomes, such that the decisionmaker’s ranking of actions corresponds to 
their expected utility (where the expected utility of an action is the sum of the utilities of 
its possible outcomes, each utility discounted by the probability of the state that, together 
with the action, produces that outcome).  Reciprocally, if the decisionmaker consciously 
maximizes the expectation of a utility function, then she automatically satisfies the 
axioms of DT.  So it is not too much of an exaggeration to say that DT and expected 
utility theory are one and the same account of rational choice.  
 
 B. DT and the Specification of Outcomes, Actions and States  
 
 What, then, is the problem of bounded rationality for DT?  Humans are 
cognitively limited, in various ways.  They have limited memories, limited computational 
abilities (even when aided by computers), make logical and mathematical errors, and so 
forth.  But how does this implicate the framework for decisionmaking set forth by DT?  
 
The key difficulty, as I see it, has to do with the specification of outcomes, 
actions, and states.  The sets of outcomes, actions, and states can be fully specified or 
incompletely specified.   
 
Start with outcomes. Remember that an outcome is a proposition or set of possible 
worlds.  An outcome is “fully specified,” for purposes of some instrumentalist normative 
framework, if any two worlds within the outcome are equally good in terms of the goals 
of that framework.  In other words, a fully specified outcome provides a description of 
what might occur which is sufficiently complete that nothing of relevance to the 
framework is left out.  
   
 Consider, for example, a Humean framework which tells decisionmakers to 
maximize their preferences.   Imagine that the decisionmaker, Jim, cares only about his 
annual income and the number of friends he has each year.  Then if a given outcome o 
describes Jim’s annual income in each year that he is alive, it is incompletely specified.   
If it describes his annual income and the number of his friends, it is fully specified.   
 
 A fully specified outcome set is a set of mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive outcomes, each of which is fully specified.  A fully specified action set 
consists of every possible action the decisionmaker could undertake at the time of choice.  
A fully specified state set consists of states which are (again) mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive, and are sufficiently well described to do what state sets are 
supposed to do in DT:  Each action, together with a state, entails one and only one 
outcome in the outcome set. 
 
  An unbounded decisionmaker can produce a fully specified state, action, and 
outcome set instantly and at zero cost (she can do so “internally” without mental strain 
                                                 
8 For an accessible discussion, see David M. Kreps, 1988, Notes on the Theory of Choice, Westview Press: 
Boulder and London. 
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and without paying for expensive computers and software).  DT is therefore most 
plausibly understood as providing the following specification norm for an unbounded 
decisionmaker: Use a fully specified outcome, action, and state set.   Why is this so?  
Consider, first, the unbounded decisionmaker who uses an incompletely specified action 
set.  In other words, she considers some of the actions that might perform at this moment, 
but not all of them. Isn’t this arbitrary?  The benefits of adding an action to the set of 
actions she already considers is that the new action might be preferable to those she 
already considers; the costs (given her unbounded abilities) are nil.  So why not consider 
it? 
 
 Consider, next, the unbounded decisionmaker who uses a fully specified action 
set, but an incompletely specified outcome set.   Where outcomes are incompletely 
specified, the basic norms of DT lose their intuitive plausibility.  I will show why this is 
so, using the norm of consequentialism.  A similar analysis applies to the other basic 
norms. 
 
  Let us continue with the example of Jim.  O' is an incompletely specified 
outcome set, where outcomes are described just in terms of Jim’s income, not his friends.   
Imagine that Jim reasons in terms of this outcome set; identifies a matching state set 
(sufficiently detailed to determine which member of O' would result, for every action he 
might perform at present); and ascertains that there are two actions, a and a+, which 
result in the very same member of O' in each state.   In s1, a results in o* and a+ also 
results in o*. In s2, a results in o** and a+ also results in o**.  And so forth for every 
state.  The norm of consequentialism tells Jim to be indifferent between a and a+.   But 
why should he be?  After all, it is possible that - in some states -- a leads to a different 
number of friends for Jim than a+.  And Jim cares about the size of his group of friends, 
not just his annual income.  So why should Jim consider a and a+ as equally good, given 
that it is costless for him to replace O' with a fully specified set O whose members 
specify what happens along both the income and the friendship dimensions, and to think 
about his choice in terms of that outcome set?   
 
 
Consider, finally, an unbounded decisionmaker who uses a fully specified action 
and outcome set, but an incompletely specified state set.  This could mean two things. 
First, it might mean that the state set is insufficiently rich for a conjunction of an action 
and a state to always entail one and only one outcome in the outcome set.  A choice 
situation, thus framed, is one in which the decisionmaker lacks relevant information 
about his choice -- and, in the case of the unbounded decisionmaker, this is a pointless 
gap, one which he could costlessly rectify through a more detailed consideration of 
possible prior histories of the world together with causal laws.9  Second, an incompletely 
specified state set might not be exhaustive.  Although each member of the action set, 
together with each member of the state set, leads to some determinate member of the 
outcome set, there is some possible state that the decisionmaker ignores.  Were he to 
                                                 
9 Again, this assumes that the decisionmaker gives zero credence to the possibility of indeterminism. See 
supra note 5. 
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consider that state, he might find that he accords it non-zero probability, and that adding 
it to the analysis changes his evaluation of the possible actions.  So why not consider it? 
 
 C. Specification and Bounded Decisionmakers  
 
 It is therefore quite straightforward to determine the content of DT’s specification 
norm, in the case of unbounded decisionmakers. Unbounded decisionmakers should use 
fully specified outcome, action, and state sets.  The difficulty arises once we allow that it 
may be costly or plain impossible for the decisionmaker to produce a fully specified 
outcome, action, and state set.  What specification norm should DT contain for this sort 
of decisionmaker -- a bounded one?  The specification norm cannot be: Use fully 
specified outcome, action, and state sets.  More precisely, given any instrumentalist 
normative framework with a sufficiently “rich” goal to generate a very large set of fully 
specified outcomes, DT coupled with a full-specification norm will be a highly 
implausible candidate to be the procedural component of this framework. 
 
 Consider the example of welfarism.  For purposes of the general discussion of 
bounded rationality, this is simply one example of a normative framework that cannot be 
plausibly fleshed out as advising decisionmakers to use a fully specified outcome, action, 
and state set.   For purposes of the methodology of legal scholarship, as we shall see in 
Part III, this is a key example.  
 
 Welfarism is really a family of moral theories, which tell the decisionmaker to 
aim at some mix of overall well-being and the equitable distribution of well-being. 10 The 
most plausible variants of welfarism understand individual well-being as the attainment 
of various “objective goods” or (what is essentially the same thing) as the attainment of 
those things everyone with full information would converge in preferring.  The most 
plausible variants of welfarism adopt an impartiality constraint: everyone’s well-being 
matters equally, or at least the well-being of everyone within a large population of 
interest does (all members of the society, for example).   In characterizing outcomes, we 
shouldn’t limit ourselves to the well-being of a single dictator or members of a small 
oligarchy, and if two outcomes differ only with respect to the identity (proper names) of 
individuals attaining particular welfare levels, they should be seen as equally good. 
  
 Consider DT as the procedural component of welfarism with an impartiality 
constraint and a reasonably extensive list of objective goods.  Imagine, for example, a 
U.S. governmental official June who attends to the well-being of all current and future 
U.S. citizens and considers the following goods: longevity, consumption, health, 
happiness, and social relations.  June presides over a pollution control agency and, at the 
present moment, has the power to regulate some toxin. 
 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Chris William Sanchirico, 2006, “Inequality and Uncertainty: Theory and 
Legal Applications,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 155, pp. 279-377; Matthew D. Adler & Eric 
A. Posner, 2006, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 25-
61. 
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 A fully specified outcome set O, for June, would be such that each oi in this set 
consists of a list of individuals who are U.S. citizens now or in the future; a consumption 
history for each individual, specifying what goods she consumes for every moment she is 
alive; a health history for each individual, specifying her health state for every moment 
she is alive; a happiness history, specifying her affective states for every moment she is 
alive; and a social history, specifying how many friends she has at each moment, what 
her social status is, and so forth. A fully specified action set A, for June, would consist of 
every possible regulation she might issue to limit the toxin.  The outcome (in O) 
produced by a given regulation would depend on the causal laws of toxicology (which 
determine the direct impacts of the toxin on health and longevity); the laws of economics 
(which determine how firms, consumers, and workers will react to a given regulation, 
thereby affecting consumption and other items); and the laws of psychology and 
sociology (which determine how an individual’s health, longevity, and consumption will 
impact his affective states, and how the distribution of consumption and other items 
affects social relations).  Thus, each state will consist of a combination of a particular 
toxicological model, economic model, psychological model, and sociological model, plus 
a specification of prior facts relevant to all the models, sufficiently detailed to lead 
determinately to one member of O for each member of the action set. 
 
 This level of specification massively exceeds the detail about possible regulations, 
outcomes, and causal models currently employed by regulators in even the largest and 
most deliberate rulemakings.11  I suggest that it would be normatively unwarranted for 
June to attempt to follow a full specification norm in implementing her welfarist goals.  
The effort might never end and, if it did, would surely consume large amounts of time 
and resources.  So what is the normatively appropriate procedure for June to follow? 
That, as I see it, is the question of bounded rationality, to which DT currently offers no 
good answer. 
 
 To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that the problem of providing a procedural 
norm that bounded decisionmakers should follow in implementing an instrumentalist 
normative framework is unanswerable.  “Cognitivists” believe that there are normative 
truths and facts. “Noncognitivists” deny this, and think that normativity is at bottom just a 
matter of what norms we wish to endorse.  Although my sympathies are cognitivist, this 
chapter can remain neutral on the issue, because the problem of bounded rationality arises 
for both cognitivists and noncognitivists.  The cognitivist must decide which normative 
framework she believes to be correct and, within that framework, which procedural 
component she believes to be correct, given humans’ cognitive limitations. The 
noncognitivist must decide which normative framework she wishes to endorse and, 
within that framework, which procedural component she wishes to endorse. 
 
 How do the cognitivist and noncognitivist settle these issues?  Both can, I think, 
avail themselves of John Rawls’ method of “reflective equilibrium.” We should decide 
what normative framework we believe is correct (the cognitivist spin), or what normative 
                                                 
11 For a discussion of the ways in which cost-benefit analysis and other regulatory decision procedures need 
to be -- and, in practice, are -- structured to be sensitive to decision costs and delay costs, see Adler & 
Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis, pp. 62-100. 
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framework we wish to endorse (the non-cognitivist spin) by striving for an internally 
coherent framework that respects (as much as possible) both our pre-equilibrium beliefs 
regarding general normative principles or our pre-equilibrium endorsements of such 
principles, and our pre-equilibrium intuitions about particular cases.  “Solving” the 
problem of bounded rationality, for a given instrumentalist framework, means modifying 
DT as a procedural norm, or perhaps replacing it with an entirely different kind of norm, 
so that the framework now has a procedural component which is acceptable in reflective 
equilibrium.  
 
 Such a solution may well exist; I do not claim otherwise.  Rather, my claim is that 
the scholarly literature on decisionmaking has not yet arrived at a solution, or even come 
close.  Let us now survey current candidate solutions and see where they fall short.  
 
II. “SOLUTIONS” TO THE PROBLEM OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY? 
 
 A. Uncertainty versus Bounded Rationality 
  
Uncertainty and bounded rationality are distinct problems. Although DT has 
solved the problem of providing attractive norms for choice where the only obstacle to 
good choice is uncertainty, these features of the view give us zero traction in addressing 
bounded rationality. 
 
 To see the distinction between uncertainty and bounded rationality, observe that 
the decisionmaker with limitless ability to conceptualize actions, states, and outcomes 
might be uncertain which state obtains.  Indeed, the central contribution of DT is to help 
us see what the procedural component of an instrumentalist normative framework 
appropriate for partly ideal agents -- ideal in the sense of having limitless mental abilities, 
nonideal in the sense of being nonomniscient -- would consist of.  In the static case, this 
decisionmaker has a fully specified outcome set, a complete and transitive ranking of 
outcomes, and a fully specified action set. But she doesn’t know which outcome would, 
in fact, result from a given action.  So she does just what DT suggests. She asks herself, 
how might the history of the world, including causal laws, have proceeded up to this 
point?  Which outcome would each action map onto, given each such state?  And how 
strongly do I believe in the various states? 
 
 In the dynamic case, this unbounded but nonomniscient decisionmaker is 
considering securing more information about the states -- at some cost.  For this case, one 
well-established aspect of DT -- “value of information analysis” (VOI) --comes into 
play.12  The basic idea is that the decisionmaker can use his outcome set and an 
appropriately enriched state set13 to evaluate information-seeking actions as much as 
other sorts of actions.   To see the basic idea in a very simple case, imagine that the 
                                                 
12On VOI, see, e.g., Robert L. Winkler, 2003, An Introduction to Bayesian Inference and Decision, 2nd ed., 
Gainesville: Probabilistic Publishing, pp. 267-350; Jack Hirshleifer & John G. Riley, 1992,The Analytics of 
Uncertainty and Information, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 167-208. 
13 That is, a state set sufficiently specified so that each state and each experiment entails one and only one 
outcome in the outcome set. 
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outcome set has four outcomes, one with utility L(ow), one with utility H(igh), one with 
utility L-K, one with utility H-K.  There are two ordinary actions, a1 and a2, that the 
decisionmaker, Phil, can take: in the first state, s1, a1 leads to the outcome with utility H 
and a2 leads to the outcome with utility L.   In the second state, s2, it is a2 that produces 
the H-utility outcome and a1 that produces the L-utility outcome.   Phil gives the first 
state a probability of .6 and the second a probability of .4.  There is an experiment Phil 
can undertake to get better information about which state obtains, at some fixed cost K in 
utility. The experiment is action a3.  Phil believes that, if s1 obtains, the experiment sends 
signal “X” with probability .9 and “Y” with probability .1.    If s2 obtains, the experiment 
sends signal “Y” with probability .9 and “X” with probability .1.  In effect, there are four 
states: s1 with a propensity to send signal X, s1 with a propensity to send signal Y, s2 with 
a propensity to send signal X, and s2 with a propensity to send signal Y.  The probabilities 
of these states are, respectively, .54, .06, .04, and .36.  This enriched state set (together 
with the assumption that Phil would respond to the experiment by updating his beliefs 
about the states in a Bayesian fashion, and then choose a1 or a2 using these updated 
beliefs) suffices to produce a determinate outcome in the outcome set for each of the 
three actions, that is, for the two ordinary actions and the experiment.  If K is sufficiently 
small and the difference between H and L sufficiently large, the experiment is worth 
undertaking --otherwise not. 
 
 
 Value of Information (VOI) Analysis 
 
  
    States 
  s1  s1  s2  s2  Expected  
  and signal X and signal Y and signal X and signal Y Utility 
  if experiment if experiment if experiment if experiment 
 
  P= .54  P =.06  P=.04  P=.36 
    
Actions 
 a1 utility H utility H utility L utility L .6H +.4L 
           
 a2 utility L utility L utility H utility H .6L+.4H 
 
 a3 utility H-K utility L-K utility L-K utility H-K [.9H + .1L] -K 
             
 
Phil attaches utility to a3 as follows. He reasons that, if he were to undertake the experiment and the true 
state of the world is s1 with a propensity to send signal X, he would receive signal X.  He would at that 
point update his probabilities in Bayesian fashion and ascribe probability .54/.58 to s1 with a propensity to 
send X, 0 to s1 with a propensity to send Y, .04/.58 to s2 with a propensity to send X, and 0 to s2 with a 
propensity to send Y.  With these new probabilities, he would choose action a1, which leads to utility H-K 
in state s1 with a propensity to send X.   Similar reasoning allows him to attach utilities to a3 in the other 
three states. 
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 VOI is a very potent tool, but it simply does not address the problem of 
specification.  It takes as given an outcome set; take as given an action set, one that 
includes some “experiments” and other information-gathering measures; and gives 
guidance in thinking through how a particular information-gathering measure might be 
understood (like an ordinary action) as a distribution across different elements of the 
outcome set, producing different outcomes in different states.  
 
  Nor does it seem fruitful to try to “adapt” VOI for the task of determining 
optimal specification. Consider the problem of optimally specifying an outcome set.   
Imagine starting with some underspecified set of outcomes O. Among the actions that the 
decisionmaker could take at t are not only ordinary actions a1, a2, and so forth, but also 
the deliberative action d of thinking about these ordinary actions using a more fully 
specified outcome set O'.  So we might imagine a “value of specification” analysis that 
marries O with this expanded action set -- in other words, it predicts the effects of 
ordinary actions {a1, a2, …} and deliberative action d in the initial outcome set O. 
 
 We would need to enrich the state set so that each state, combined with d, 
produces one and only one outcome in O.  One way to do that is to combine the initial 
state set {s1, s2, …}, sufficient for determining the outcomes in O of the ordinary actions, 
with statements about what would occur if the decisionmaker were to think about the 
ordinary actions with a more refined outcome set O'. So the state set becomes something 
like: {s1 and if I were to use outcome set O' in choosing among the ordinary actions I 
would pick a1; s1 and if I were to use outcome set O' in choosing among the ordinary 
actions I would pick a2; ….. ; s2 and if I were to use outcome set O' in choosing among 
the ordinary actions I would pick a1; s2 and if I were to use outcome set O' in choosing 






“Value of Specification” Analysis? 
     
  Original Choice Situation, with Ordinary Actions     
 
    States 
  s1     s2 
Actions 
 a1 o     o*  
 




  New Choice Situation, with Ordinary Actions plus Deliberative Action d of 
Refining Outcome Set from O to O'.    
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     States 
 
 s1 and   s1 and         … s2 and  s2 and       … 
 if I were to use O' if I were to use O' if I were to  if I were to use O'   
 to choose among  to choose among   use O' to choose to choose among 
 {a1, a2, …} I would  {a1, a2, …} I would among {a1, a2, …}{a1, a2, …} I would  
 pick a1   pick a2.   I would pick a1 pick a2.   
 
Actions 
a1 o   o   o*  o* 
  




d o+   o++   o+++  o++++ 
 
Every outcome in this matrix is an outcome in the original outcome set O.  Note that o+ and o need not be 
the same outcome.  That is, the outcome in O of simply picking a1 (outcome o) need not be the same as the 
outcome in O of picking a1 after deliberating among the ordinary actions using a refined outcome set O' 
(outcome o+).  Outcome o+ may well reflect the increased deliberational expenses that flow from choosing 
d rather than one of the ordinary actions. Similarly, o++ need not be the same outcome in O as o**, o+++ 
need not be the same outcome as o*, and so on. 
 
 Note that this device allows the decisionmaker to consider undertaking action d 
and using a more refined outcome set, without actually incurring the costs of doing d. (If 
she decides just to undertake one of the ordinary actions {a1, a2, …} rather than doing d, 
she never actually chooses among the ordinary actions using the more refined outcome 
set.)  So this seems like a promising start to the problem of analyzing the value of 
refining an outcome set.   
 
 But there is a problem. From an initial outcome set O, there may be many 
different refinements.  Consider our decisionmaker June.  She cares about individuals’ 
well-being, understood to depend on their longevity and moment-to-moment 
consumption sequences, health sequences, happiness, and social relations for all moments 
individuals are alive.  She starts with an outcome set where each outcome specifies 
individuals’ longevity and average annual consumption.  She could undertake action d1, 
which means using a refined outcome set that specifies individual’ moment-to-moment 
(rather than annual) consumption; or do d2 and use a different refined set, that specifies 
individuals’ annual consumption and average annual health; or do d3 and use yet a 
different refined set that specifies individuals’ moment-to-moment consumption and 
moment-to-moment happiness; and so forth.  There are a very large number of such di. 
Considering all of them will be costly for the bounded decisionmaker; but there is 
nothing in the VOI framework, either directly or by analogy, which suggests how to limit 
the set of deliberative actions d1, d2 … that the decisionmaker considers. 
 
 A similar point is that the decisionmaker can start with different outcome sets.  
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June might start with ordinary actions {a1, a2, …} and a initial outcome set O that 
specifies individuals’ consumption, and from that starting point think about the outcomes 
in O of deliberative actions which pick among the ordinary actions using some 
refinement of O.  Or, June might start with ordinary actions {a1, a2, …} and an initial 
outcome set O* that specifies individuals’ happiness, and from that starting point think 
about the outcomes in O* of deliberative actions which pick among the ordinary actions 
using some refinement of O*.  Again, there is nothing in VOI, directly or by analogy, 
which helps guide June in determining which outcome set she should start with. 
  
 
 B.  Optimal search 
  
 Economists since George Stigler have entertained the notion of optimal search.  
Consider the individual who wants to buy a good, has found some willing sellers with 
various asking prices, and is trying to decide whether to look for a seller with a lower 
asking price, given that the costs of searching are positive.  Stigler’s suggestion is that, in 
this sort of case, the rational individual searches only if doing so increases expected 
utility -- given expected search costs, the probability of finding a seller with a lower 
asking price, and the expected benefit of doing so.14 
 
 The optimal-search notion seems sensible enough in the case of a decisionmaker 
with zero analytic costs but positive costs of “searching” in the sense of making physical 
efforts to locate goods.  Such a decisionmaker can consider every possible sequence of 
bodily movements he might make, every possible choice situation that might eventuate 
along each sequence, the choices he would make in each such situation, and the possible 
results of each such choice - and then decide whether to initiate some sequence of bodily 
movements, as opposed to engaging in an immediate act of consumption, by maximizing 
expected utility.  It is harder to see how the optimal-search notion is helpful for the 
decisionmaker with positive analytic costs.   
 
Consider adapting the notion to the specification of choice sets (where it seems, at 
first blush, applicable). How exactly does this work?   Building on the discussion in the 
previous section, perhaps we might say this.  The decisionmaker’s outcome set O is 
fixed.  He has some initial choice set {a1, a2, …}.  There are additional options {x1, x2, 
…} not in the initial choice set.  Rather than just considering those, he considers a 
“choice-set-expansion” choice e.   Performing a choice-set-expansion choice such as e 
means expanding the initial choice set  {a1, a2, …} in some way.  For example, e might 
mean expanding {a1, a2, …} to {a1, a2, …, x1}.   The decisionmaker evaluates the 
outcomes of a choice such as e in the outcome set O with an appropriately enriched state 
set -- one with conditionals of the form, “were I to consider this expanded choice set, I 
would choose this action”. 
 
Analyzing the Value of Expanding a Choice Set 
 
                                                 
14 See George J. Stigler, 1961, “The Economics of Information,” Journal of Political Economy, 69, pp. 
213-225.  
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 But this procedure is perverse for a decisionmaker with positive analytic costs (at 
least absent an intrinsic preference for the very process of decision analysis).  The 
analytic costs of considering an expansion option e -- the option of supplementing the 
initial choice set {a1, a2, …} with some choice x1 -- are greater than just adding x1 to the 
choice set without thinking about it and then choosing among {a1, a2, … x1}.  In order to 
evaluate {a1, a2, …, e}in terms of our fixed outcome set O, the decisionmaker must have 
a set of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive states sufficiently richly described 
so that:  each state maps each of the initial actions {a1, a2, …}onto one and only element 
of O;  each state maps the choice e onto one action in the choice set {a1, a2, … x1}, that 
is, each state determines which action in the expanded set the decisionmaker would 
choose, were she to expand the set; and, in each state where expanding the choice set 
would lead the decisionmaker to choose x1,  x1 is mapped onto one and only element of O.   
In order to evaluate the choice set {a1, a2, …, x1} in terms of our fixed outcome set O, the 
decisionmaker needs  a less elaborate state set: she needs a set of mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive states such that each state maps each of the initial actions {a1, a2, 
…} onto one and only one element of O, and each state maps x1 onto one and only one 
element of O.   Simply adding x1 to the choice set without thinking and then choosing 
from the expanded set is less analytically laborious than thinking about adding x1 to the 
choice set -- so why not just take the first course? 
  
 A second and equally serious difficulty for the proposal now under discussion is 
this:  If we start with some subset {a1, a2, …} of the totality of actions open to the 
decisionmaker right now, there are a huge number of choice-set-expansion options e1, e2, 
e3, … where each ei expands the initial subset in a different way.  And there is nothing in 
the optimal-search literature that I am aware of which explains how the bounded 
decisionmaker should narrow the choice-set-expansion options being considered -- in 
effect, how he should narrow down the set of possible searches, and think about only 
some of them. 
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 C. Tversky and Kahneman and the “Heuristics and Biases” Program 
 
 Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, and co-workers have shown that real-world 
individuals are characterized by a variety of “heuristics and biases,”15 and this now-
famous research has, in recent years, generated much legal scholarship, under the banner 
of “behavioral law and economics.”  One heuristic identified by Tversky and Kahneman, 
“prospect theory,” involves a framework for decisionmaking which directly violates DT.   
In brief:  decisionmakers do not think in terms of the value of outcomes, but rather in 
terms of the value of losses and gains relative to some reference point.  The value 
function for losses is convex, the value function for gains is concave, and the loss 
function is steeper than the gain function.  Where the possible losses and gains resulting 
from a choice are uncertain, individuals do not weight the value of possible losses and 
gains by their probabilities, but rather by a weighting function which is an S-shaped 
transformation of the probabilities.   
 
 A different set of heuristics involve “judgments” rather than choice.  These are 
processes by which individuals form beliefs -- in particular, processes by which 
individuals make probability judgments.  The three judgment heuristics originally 
identified by Tversky and Kahneman were “representativeness”, “availability”, and 
“anchoring and adjustment.”   In brief: the representativeness heuristic involves judging 
whether some possible state of the world is true, given some data, by focusing on whether 
the data is representative of the state.  The prior probability of the state is ignored. 
“Availability” means ascribing higher probabilities to states whose instances are easier to 
recall from memory.  “Anchoring and adjustment” means making probability judgments 
(or other magnitude estimates) by starting from some initial, arbitrary value.   
 
 Sometimes, the heuristics identified by Tversky, Kahneman and their successors 
are termed instances of “bounded rationality.”  But do these heuristics in fact help solve 
the normative problem of “bounded rationality” as I have described it here?   To begin, it 
should be noted that Tversky, Kahneman and others working in this tradition generally 
seem to see the heuristics and biases they identify as departures from rationality -- as 
deviations from the true norms of choice, embodied in DT, and the true norms of 
judgment, embodied in probability theory.16 
 
 To be sure, prospect-theoretic choice, and probability judgments driven by 
representativeness, availability, or anchoring and adjustment, could really be part of the 
correct procedural component of the correct normative framework, whatever Tversky and 
Kahneman think.  While that is true, these heuristics are not particularly relevant on the 
                                                 
15 For reviews of this scholarship, see, e.g., Jonathan Baron, 2000, Thinking and Deciding, 3d ed., 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Reid Hastie & Robyn M. Dawes, 2001, Rational Choice in an 
Uncertain World,  Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications; Gideon Keren & Karl H. Teigen, 2004, “Yet 
Another Look at the Heuristics and Biases Approach,” in Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey, eds., Blackwell 
Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making, Malden: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 89-109; Daniel 
Kahneman, 2003, “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Bounded Economics,”  American 
Economic Review, 93, pp. 1449-75. 
16 See Gerd Gigerenzer et al., 1999, Simple Heuristics that Make Us Smart, New York: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 25-29; Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality, p. 1456. 
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issue at hand: namely, how to revise DT, and the norm of full specification, so as to be 
usable by bounded decisionmakers.  Prospect theory is just orthogonal to that question.  It 
tells the decisionmaker to transform outcomes into losses and gains from a reference 
point, and to transform the probabilities of states by an S-shaped function.  How to 
characterize outcomes in the first place (the problem of specifying an outcome set), and 
which actions to consider (the problem of specifying an action set), are not a part of the 
theory.  
 
The judgment heuristics, too, give no guidance about how to specify an outcome, 
state, or action set.   However, these heuristics could be seen as an important adjunct to 
DT revised for the bounded decisionmaker.  They might be an appropriate way for that 
decisionmaker to economize on the analytic costs of assigning probabilities to states, at 
least in the case of “small” decisions.  But, intuitively, all or at least many instrumentalist 
normative frameworks will identify a class of “large” decisions where it would be 
unwarranted for the decisionmaker not to think more systematically about her decisions.  
(I am pointing to intuitions because, on a reflective-equilibrium account of normative 
reasoning, intuitions matter.)   The whole apparatus of probability theory and statistics is 
a methodology for thinking more systematically about our probability ascriptions.  
Consider welfarism.  Within the framework of welfarism, aren’t there at least some 
decisions -- in particular, governmental decisions to issue statutes or regulations that 
govern many individuals -- where the deployment of this apparatus is the right thing to 
do?  
 
I will not try to identify this class of “large” decisions more precisely, using 
criteria that a bounded decisionmaker could employ.   I don’t see how I could do so 
except as part of a more general normative account of decisionmaking by bounded actors 
-- the very problem that no one has yet managed to solve.  But it is implausible, I suggest, 
to think that the class is null or small, and thus implausible to take representativeness, 
availability, anchoring and adjustment, and similar “quick and dirty” judgment heuristics 
as anything like full solutions to the question of how bounded individuals should make 
probability ascriptions. 
 
D.  Simon and Satisficing 
 
 Herbert Simon is the pioneer in normative work on choice by bounded agents.17  
He rightly and famously argued that computational costs undermine expected-utility 
theory as a general account of rational choice.  But -- notwithstanding all the credit 
Simon is owed for initiating this field of inquiry -- he did not, I suggest, succeed in 
solving the problem of bounded rationality. 
 
                                                 
17 See generally Herbert Simon, 1982, 1997, Models of Bounded Rationality, Vols. 1-3, Cambridge: MIT 
Press; Herbert Simon, 1979, 1989, Models of Thought, Vols. 1-2, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
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 Simon proposed that bounded agents rationally “satisfice.”18 Satisficing, 
generally, means setting a threshold or aspiration level for a choice.  Rather than 
constructing a full action set, consisting of every option open to her, the decisionmaker 
begins to enumerate these options (systematically or not) and chooses the first  one that is 
“good enough” -- that meets the aspiration level.   Satisficing is, therefore, directly 
responsive to the problem that constructing a full action set may be infeasible or hugely 
expensive for the bounded agent.   
 
 But is satisficing a normatively attractive solution to this problem?  That depends 
on how the aspiration level is set.  Some scholars (not Simon) suggest that an aspiration 
level might be set in terms of expected utility.19  For this proposal to be workable, we 
would need to solve the problem of simplifying the outcome set.  Calculating the 
expected utility of an action by identifying its possible outcomes in a fully specified 
outcome set, developing a matching state set, and then assigning utilities to the outcomes 
and probabilities to the states, would be infeasible or at least unwarranted if the fully 
specified outcome set is very large.   We would also, of course, need to provide a 
normatively attractive proposal for setting the aspiration level while economizing on 
computation costs (relative to doing DT with a fully specified outcome set).  I am not 
aware of plausible suggestions on these two fronts. 
  
 A different possibility is to set an aspiration level for choices in terms of some 
non-utility features of choices -- for example, deciding which house to purchase by 
looking for houses until one meets a price cutoff and a size cutoff.   But how do we do 
this where the impact of choices on the outcomes we care about is uncertain? 
 
 Simon, in his original work on satisficing, offered a very simple suggestion.  Take 
every outcome and make a binary judgment that the outcome is either “satisfactory” (a 
value of 1) or “unsatisfactory” (a value of 0).   A choice, then, meets the aspiration level 
if it has a satisfactory outcome in every state.   
 
 This solution (upon examination) leaves untouched the problem of specifying an 
outcome set.  Are we supposed to consider whether the possible outcomes of an action in 
the fully-specified outcome set are always 1 or 0? In many cases, this will be infeasible or 
hugely expensive.  Reciprocally, once we fix an incompletely specified outcome set 
appropriate for the problem at hand, it will sometimes -- for some “large” decisions -- be 
appropriate to order these outcomes on some finer scale than a binary scale.   
  
 A different solution is to pick certain aspects or dimensions of outcomes that are 
relevant to the goals adopted by our normative framework; produce a simplified set of 
outcomes that differ with respect to these dimensions; and set an aspiration level for 
choice in terms of the expected value of choices with respect to the selected dimensions.  
                                                 
18 See Herbert Simon, 1955, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” in both Models of Bounded 
Rationality and Models of Thought.  For discussions of satisficing by other scholars, see Michael Byron, 
1998, “Satisficing and Optimality,” Ethics, 109, pp. 67-93;  Michael Byron, ed., 2004, Satisficing and 
Maximizing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
19 See Byron, “Satisficing and Optimality.” 
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(For example, Fred may care about his income, his living space, his aesthetic experience, 
his happiness, and many other things.  He focuses just on income and living space; and 
decides to bid on a house whose expected cost is no more than $300,000 and whose 
expected living space is at least 2000 square feet.)  If the simplified outcome set is 
sufficiently simplified, this may reduce to a case of choice under certainty.  (Fred will, in 
fact, know what the contract price and the living space of his house is.)    
 
 One difficulty here is identifying the dimensions of outcomes to focus upon.  
Intuitively, we want to pick the most “important” dimension -- but identifying that 
dimension, while economizing on analytic costs, may prove tricky, as I shall discuss in a 
moment.  Quite apart from this issue, the variant of satisficing now under consideration 
still faces the problem of specifying a non-arbitrary aspiration level.   
 
 E.  Gigerenezer, “Take the Best” and Noncompensatory Choice Procedures 
 
A body of recent work on bounded rationality has focused on “noncompensatory” 
heuristics.   Much of this scholarship has been undertaken by Gerd Gigerenzer,20 who is 
notable for his endorsement of heuristics as rational.  He sees their use, not as a deviation 
from rationality, but as a rational response to computational demands. 
 
Gigerenzer and his co-workers have focused on judgment rather than choice -- in 
particular, on prediction tasks -- and have analyzed a heuristic they call “Take the 
Best”(TTB). 21   Imagine that there is a population of objects.  The individual is given 
pairs of objects, and tries to predict which object has a higher value on some criterion.  
Each object in the population has a series of k binary cues.  The predictor (in the simplest 
case) knows whether each object he is presented has a negative or positive value for each 
of the k cues, and knows the ecological validity of each cue -- that is, the frequency, 
across all pairs of objects where one object has a positive cue value and the other not, 
with which the positive value object has the higher criterion value. TTB tells the 
individual to follow this procedure in predicting which object in a pair has a higher 
criterion value:  Order the cues in the order of their validity; if the most valid cue assigns 
a positive value to one object and a negative value to the other, choose the first object; 
otherwise, move on to the next-most-valid cue and, if that doesn’t differentiate, the next, 
ultimately picking randomly between the objects if no cue differentiates.  
 
TTB is a noncompensatory rule in the sense that the information about a pair of 
objects provided by a higher-validity cue can never be outweighed by the information 
provided by lower-validity cues.  Gigerenzer’s research finds TTB to be surprisingly 
accurate in a variety of prediction tasks.  
 
                                                 
20 See Gigerenzer, Simple Heuristics that Make Us Smart; Gerd Gigerenzer, 2000, Adaptive Thinking: 
Rationality in the Real World, New York: Oxford University Press; Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten, 
eds., 1999, Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox, Cambridge: MIT Press;  Gerd Gigerenzer, 2006, 
“Heuristics,” in Gerd Gigerenezer & Christoph Engel, eds.,  Heuristics and the Law, Cambridge: MIT 
Press, pp. 17-44.  
21 See, e.g., Simple Heuristics that Make Us Smart, pp. 75-95. 
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TTB is closely related to noncompensatory choice procedures that other scholars 
have studied.22  Much of this work has focused on choice under certainty.  Now, there are 
multiple choices, not necessarily a pair; the choices have values on k dimensions; the 
decisionmaker’s true preference is some weighted sum of the values on the k dimensions.  
One sort of noncompensatory procedure in this context is the “lexicographic” rule -- the 
analogy of TTB in the prediction context.  Order the dimensions by their weights, top to 
bottom.  Given a choice situation, pick the choice with the highest value on the top 
dimension.  If there are multiple choices tied for the highest value on the top dimension, 
pick among these using the next-top dimension; and so forth.  A different, even simpler 
noncompensatory procedure is to choose using only the top dimension -- and then pick 
randomly among choices tied for the highest value on this dimension. 
 
 These ideas, in turn, can be generalized to the case of choice under uncertainty, 
and to the case of any instrumentalist normative framework (not just the Humean 
framework), along something like the following lines. The goals of the framework define 
a fully-specified outcome set. The goals also order the outcomes and allow the 
assignment of a utility to each outcome, representing its place in the ordering.  Assume, 
further, that these utilities are the weighted sum of an outcome’s “subutilities” along k 
dimensions or aspects of the outcomes.  The top-value rule says this: define a simplified 
outcome set, where outcomes differ only with respect to the top dimension.   Use a DT 
framework, framed in terms of that simplified outcome set, to choose between the 
alternatives -- and if actions are equally good in terms of that set, choose randomly. The 
lexicographic rule says: Define a simplified outcome set, where outcomes differ only 
with respect to the top dimension.   Use a DT framework to choose between the 
alternatives, using that simplified outcome set.  If two or more are tied for best, move on 
to the next-best dimension, and frame a DT problem in terms of an outcome set specified 
with respect to that dimension.  If two or more remain tied for best, move on to the third-
best dimension to choose between these …. 
  
 An initial difficulty with such lexicographic or single-value procedures is that 
they do not help with the problem of specifying an action set.   
 
 But don’t they at least give us some traction in simplifying the outcome set? One 
difficulty is that the utilities which the normative framework assigns to outcomes may not 
be representable as the linear sum of k dimensions.  The literature on multiattribute utility 
theory shows that a linear decomposition of preferences (and, more generally, goals) 
presupposes special conditions which are not, plausibly, general requirements of 
rationality.23  Absent a linear decomposition, it may not be meaningful to say that one 
dimension or aspect of outcomes is weightier than another in terms of the framework.  A 
different and obvious problem is that, even if the utility numbers that the framework 
                                                 
22 See John W. Payne et al., 1993, The Adaptive Decisionmaker, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
Robin M. Hogarth & Natalia Karelaia, 2007, “Heuristic and Linear Models of Judgment: Matching Rules 
and Environments,” Psychological Review, 114, pp. 733-58; Barbara Fasolo et al., 2007, “Escaping the 
Tyranny of Choice: When Fewer Attributes Make Choice Easier,” Marketing Theory, 7, pp. 13-26. 
23 See Detlof von Winterfeldt & Ward Edwards, 1986, Decision Analysis and Behavioral Research, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 331-34. 
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assigns to fully specified outcomes are linearly decomposable into the sum of weighted 
dimensions, the bounded individual may not know what those weights are.   
 
 A third and distinct problem is this: Noncompensatory procedures are not 
perfectly accurate and, in some environments, may be sufficiently less accurate than 
compensatory procedures to be inadvisable.  Robin Hogarth and Natalia Karelaia have 
undertaken substantial research on the accuracy of noncompensatory prediction and 
choice procedures.24  Although the answer is complicated, one important determinant of 
whether noncompensatory procedures are much less accurate than compensatory 
procedures is (not surprisingly) the true weights of the cues or dimensions.  If the true 
value or utility of an item is the weighted sum of k cues or dimensions, and if one cue or 
dimension has a much larger weight, then a noncompensatory procedure using that cue or 
dimension will tend to be quite accurate.  If the weights are closer to equal, then a 
noncompensatory procedure will tend to be less accurate.  
 
 Consider, then, a decisionmaker facing a large choice: one in which, it seems, it is 
rational to expend substantial decisional costs to get the decision right. And imagine that 
our decisionmaker believes that there is no one dimension of fully specified outcomes 
that dominates the others, in terms of the goals she is trying to attain.  Imagine, for 
example, our official June, who cares about individuals’ well-being, and believes that 
well-being is a matter of longevity, consumption, health, happiness, and social relations, 
with none taking lexical priority over the others.  June is overseeing the issuance of a 
major rule, which (she thinks) will change the well-being of many individuals over many 
years.   June finds that one version of the rule maximizes population attainments with 
respect to the dimension of well-being she takes to be most important -- say, health.  But 
the difference between the best rule and the next best in terms of population health is 
small, and June is wondering whether to consider how the rules compare on the other 
dimensions.  Wouldn’t she be rational to consider that -- at least if the other dimensions 
are measurable without huge expense and there is no emergency requiring immediate 
issuance of the rule?  
 
 In short, while noncompensatory strategies may well be normatively advisable in 
an important range of cases -- for small decisions, or where the decisionmaker believes 
there is a dominant dimension in the framework’s ordering -- they are more problematic 
in others (large decisions without dominant dimensions). 
  
 F. Departing from DT: Dropping the Axioms or Dropping the Structure  
 
 DT consists of a certain structure for thinking about decisions, plus a set of norms.  
The attractiveness of these norms has been challenged.  It has been suggested that the 
rational decisionmaker might only have a partial rather than complete ordering of 
outcomes.25  It has also been argued (particularly in the context of social choice) that it 
                                                 
24 See Hogarth & Karelaia, “Heuristic and Linear Models,” and their prior scholarship cited therein.  
25 See, e.g., Adler & Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis, pp. 161-62. 
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might be appropriate to violate the independence norm.26  Finally, some have even 
suggested that violations of transitivity are rational.27 
 
 But these discussions are largely orthogonal to the problem of bounded 
rationality.  As long as the decisionmaker is supposed to think about her choice in terms 
of outcomes -- whether or not her ranking of those is supposed to be complete or even 
transitive, and whether or not she is supposed to comply with independence -- the 
problem remains that we have no good theory for how to simplify the outcome set to 
make it tractable for bounded decisionmakers.  
 
 A more radical revision of DT would be to change its structure.  Might we 
develop a procedural component for our normative frameworks that enjoins or permits 
the decisionmaker to ignore outcomes entirely (and therefore, also, to ignore states), and 
to focus just on her actions?   There is a literature on non-instrumentalist approaches to 
decisionmaking, which I will not attempt to survey here.28  Such approaches might avoid 
or mitigate the problem of bounded human cognitive abilities.  But they would sit very 
uneasily with instrumentalist normative frameworks, such as welfarism, other 
consequentialist moral frameworks, or any other normative framework that is oriented 
around some goal.  Indeed, they would sit very uneasily with pluralist normative 
frameworks, which incorporate both goals and other requirements (e.g., a hybrid moral 
view that tells the actor to maximize social welfare within deontological “side 
constraints”).  Anyone attracted to any instrumentalist or pluralist normative framework 
should hesitate to adopt a procedural norm that tells the actor to ignore outcomes.  
  
 
III. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
 
 At this point, the reader is surely growing impatient.  What on earth does the 
problem of bounded rationality have to do with the methodology of legal scholarship? 
 
 The connection is this. The problem of bounded rationality will stymie any 
attempt to provide an instrumentalist methodology for prescriptive legal scholarship. 
Legal scholarship may be prescriptive, providing recommendations to legislators, judges, 
and other legal officials; or it may be nonprescriptive, seeking to describe or explain the 
behaviors of various actors.   A methodology for legal scholarship furnishes norms for 
legal scholars themselves.  In the case of prescriptive legal scholarship, it tells legal 
scholars how to go about making recommendations to legislators, judges, and other legal 
officials.   A methodology for prescriptive legal scholarship is instrumentalist if it tells 
legal scholars to make those recommendations by determining which laws and policies 
maximize some goal.   
 
                                                 
26 See Adler & Sanchirico, “Inequality and Uncertainty,” pp. 334-50. 
27 See Larry S. Temkin, 1996, “A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 
25, pp. 175-210. 
28See Elijah Millgram, ed., 2001, Varieties of Practical Reasoning, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
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 If legal scholars were cognitively unbounded, an instrumentalist methodology for 
prescriptive legal scholarship would naturally incorporate DT as its guidance for legal 
scholars -- with the further guidance, on the crucial issue of specification, that legal 
scholars employ fully specified outcome, action, and state sets.  It would instruct the 
scholar making recommendations to some class of legal officials to consider all possible 
actions that the officials might undertake; to evaluate each action with reference to an 
outcome set that is fully specified in light of the goal of the methodology; to do so using a 
fully specified state set (containing mutually exclusively and collectively exhaustive 
states, each of which maps a given action onto a single outcome); and to do so consistent 
with the norms of DT, i.e., completeness, transitivity, consequentialism, dominance and 
independence.   
 
However, because legal scholars are not cognitively unbounded, it is very 
difficulty to say what norms an instrumentalist methodology for prescriptive legal 
scholarship should contain on this crucial issue of specification.  This is one implication 
(among many) of the general analysis presented in Parts I and II.  The general problem is 
that reflection about appropriate decisionmaking -- by economists, philosophers, decision 
theorists, and others who study decisionmaking norms -- has currently reached no point 
of reflective equilibrium with respect to how bounded decisionmakers should use the 
apparatus of DT.29  The implications of this problem for legal scholarship are that anyone 
reflecting on the appropriate methodology for legal scholarship will have difficulty 
reaching reflective equilibrium with respect to how legal scholars giving advice to 
decisionmakers should use DT to formulate that advice. 
 
 It would be absurd to suggest that the implications of bounded rationality for legal 
scholarship are its most important or interesting implications.  I certainly do not claim 
that!   Cognitive limitations are a pervasive feature of humans, and thus bounded 
rationality is a pervasive problem for attempts to specify normative frameworks for 
aspects of human life -- including but hardly limited to legal scholarship.  Still, legal  
scholars should understand that bounded rationality is a pervasive problem, which will 
stymie their own efforts to rationalize their own activities.  I do not believe this point has 
been sufficiently understood.   And it is one worth articulating in a book on the 
methodology of law and economics. 
 
 I will elaborate the implications of bounded rationality for legal scholarship by 
focusing on Fairness versus Welfare (FW).  FW is the most sustained attempt, in recent 
years, to provide a methodology for prescriptive legal scholarship.  Although FW is, to 
some extent, addressed to governmental officials, it consists, first and foremost, of 
guidance for legal scholars and other policy analysts. 
  
Our object has been to convince legal policy analysts to pursue a research agenda focused 
on identifying which legal rules best promote individuals’ well-being … It should be clear … that 
our claim concerns legal academics and other policy analysts, not ordinary individuals who must 
make decisions in everyday life. …  We [also] acknowledge that the problem of government 
officials is complicated by the fact that their constituents may not always be able to understand 
proper analyses of legal rules (or of many other government policies).  Nevertheless, we believe 
                                                 
29 On reflective equilibrium, see above, text accompanying note 10. 
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that responsible government decisionmakers will be able to make better policy decisions if those 
who analyze legal policy devote themselves to identifying the effects of legal rules on individuals’ 
well-being -- that is, if they employ welfare economics rather than base their analysis on notions 
of fairness.30    
 
 The normative framework that FW adopts is welfarism.  FW argues that legal 
scholars should identify and recommend the legal rules that advance the goal of social 
welfare - meaning the overall well-being of some population of interest but potentially 
also the distribution of well-being in the population.31  To put this formally, legal scholars 
should identify the legal rules that maximize a “social welfare function”: a utility 
function that assigns a utility number to each outcome as a function of individuals’ well-
being numbers in that outcome, and that does so without reference to the identity of the 
individuals (no dictatorship or proper names), and with the understanding that these well-
being numbers are interpersonally comparable.32  By well-being, FW means the 
satisfaction of fully informed preferences.33  FW criticizes the traditional approach to 
law-and-economics scholarship, which is to evaluate laws and policies with reference to 
wealth-maximization or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.34  FW also famously recommends that 
legal scholars should ignore extra-welfarist or “fairness” considerations.   
 
 FW, although lengthy, is incomplete. A fully developed welfarist methodology for 
prescriptive legal scholarship would have a full procedural component, explaining in 
greater detail how scholars should pursue the task of identifying welfare-maximizing 
legal rules. 35  But any attempt to do that, I suggest, would run headlong into the problem 
of bounded rationality. 
 
The conundrum of a legal scholar, trying to identify the legal rules that maximize 
social welfare, is quite analogous to that of our hypothetical welfarist governmental 
official June.    Just as June needs to somehow narrow down the set of possible legal rules 
that she might promulgate, so the scholar must somehow narrow down the set of possible 
legal rules that he might investigate.   The scholar, like June, wants to evaluate a given 
legal rule by considering the different outcomes that the rule might have, depending on 
the state of the world -- ignoring non-well-being facts about outcomes and focusing just 
on facts about well-being.  But, again, an outcome set consisting “just” of outcomes fully 
specified with respect to well-being facts would be huge -- given that each individual’s 
well-being is multidimensional, and given that social welfare is a function of everyone’s 
well-being (not just the well-being of a single dictator).  As Kaplow and Shavell explain: 
 
  The notion of well-being used in welfare economics is comprehensive in nature. It 
incorporates in a positive way everything that an individual might value -- goods and services that 
the individual can consume, social and environmental amenities, personally held notions of 
                                                 
30 P. 472.  See generally pp. 382-402. 
31 FW does not take a position on the membership of this population.  See p. 26 n.19. 
32 See pp. 24-28. 
33 See pp. 18-24, 410-13. 
34 See pp. 35-38, 458-61. 
35 FW itself, it should be noted, does not discuss the problem -- which I take to be crucial -- of how legal 
scholars should construct outcome, action and state sets.  There is a brief discussion of how welfarist 
scholars should reach conclusions under uncertainty, which does not address the problem.  See pp. 457-58 
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fulfillment, sympathetic feelings for others, and so forth.  Similarly, an individual’s well-being 
reflects in a negative way harms to his or her person and property, costs and inconveniences, and 
anything else that the individual might find distasteful.  Well-being is not restricted to hedonistic 
and materialistic enjoyment or to any other named class of pleasures and pains. 36 
 
Finally, like June, the scholar must somehow whittle down his state set.  Policies produce 
outcomes (inter alia) by affecting human behavior.  So a computationally unbounded 
scholar predicting the effect of a given policy on a given set of outcomes would consider 
every possible model of human behavior to which he ascribes some nonzero probability -
- not just the traditional model of expected utility maximization, and prospect theory, but 
every alternative.  More precisely, if there are N individuals in the population, and a 
(presumably very large) finite number M of behavioral models to which he ascribes a 
nonzero probability,  he should consider every composite model which says that 
individual i behaves in accordance with model j -- leading to MN composite models. This 
is an overwhelming task for bounded scholars.  
 
 As an illustration of the difficulty I am describing, consider optimal tax 
scholarship -- the main area in which scholars have explicitly used social welfare 
functions to evaluate policies and, on Kaplow and Shavell’s view, the model for 
normative legal scholarship.37 James Mirrlees, in his original, Nobel-prize winning work, 
sought to determine the optimal income tax schedule, given the following assumptions: 
 
 Imagine an economy where individuals have the innate ability to transform working-time 
into a single consumption good, which is called income.  Each individual’s utility is a numerical 
function which depends only on his net income and the quantity of labour he supplies. Thus his 
preferences are personal.  Individuals are regarded as identical except that they vary in their ability 
to supply labor.  Thus they can be grouped by productivity types. For the same number of hours 
worked, a more able person naturally can produce more income.  Each individual decides how 
much labour to supply, calculating what will maximize his utility. All these labour supply 
decisions taken together determine the output of the economy …. [Government] cannot monitor 
the number of working hours a person chooses to work, but can only observe a person’s income.  
For this reason the only policy the government can execute is to impose a tax schedule.  The 
government chooses the income tax schedule which maximizes its social welfare function, 
knowing the manner in which individuals of any productivity type will respond. 38  
 
We see, here, a radical simplification in the characterization of outcomes.  Well-being is 
a function of income and leisure, nothing else.  We also see a radical simplification in the 
state set.   In particular, prospect theory and every other non-expected utility model of 
individual behavior are ignored.   And a very simplified model of the economy is adopted 
(each worker cannot change his productivity, and his wage rate is solely a function of his 
productivity).  Finally, Mirrlees in his original work ignored the possibility of optimizing 
a social welfare function by combining an income tax schedule with other policies.    
 
                                                 
36 P. 18. 
37 See FW pp. 31 n.31. 
38 Matti Tuomala, 1990, Optimal Income Tax and Redistribution, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 4-5.  
See also pp. 86-105.  For the original paper, see James Mirrlees, 2006, Welfare, Incentives, and Taxation, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 131-73. 
 24
These were understandable simplifications.  Even a Mirrlees is human and faces 
computational limits!  The problem is that we lack a persuasive normative account to tell 
us whether the simplifications Mirrlees adopted were the right ones -- whether he 
simplified too much, or too little, or along the right dimensions.39 
 
 Some readers of early drafts of this chapter have been puzzled by my focus, here, 
on the bounded rationality of scholars.  Isn’t that a secondary or meta-problem?  FW 
instructs legal scholars to identify the laws and policies that maximize social welfare.  In 
order to do so, scholars must predict how different laws and policies will affect the well-
being of individuals in the population. Those effects will depend, inter alia, on the 
behavior of legal officials and private citizens.  Officials and citizens may have cognitive 
limitations, and may deviate from the model of expected utility maximization posited by 
traditional economics.  Isn’t it this deviation -- not the cognitive limitations of legal 
scholars themselves -- that constitutes the primary threat to FW’s welfarist methodology 
for legal scholars? 
 
 I think not.  If legal scholars were unboundedly rational, the fact that non-scholars 
-- private citizens or legal officials -- might deviate from expected utility maximization 
would not frustrate FW’s program for legal scholarship.  In general, DT imposes norms 
of rationality on the decisionmaker using DT; but it is agnostic about the nature of the 
casual models driving the human actors or nonhuman processes in the decisionmaker’s 
environment.40  DT as a framework for prescriptive legal scholarship imposes norms of 
rationality on the scholar herself; but it is agnostic about the nature of the causal models 
that determine the effects of legal rules, including causal models of the behavior of 
individuals and government officials.  Unboundedly rational legal scholars using DT’s 
state-outcome-action framework could, without difficulty, be sensitive both to the 
possibility that some or all citizens and officials might conform to expected utility 
maximization, and to the possibility that some or all citizens or officials might fail to 
conform.  In one (improbable!) state within the state set, all conform; in another state, 
none do; in other states, some do and some don’t. 
 
 Of course, prescriptive legal scholars are addressing their recommendations to 
government officials.  But I don’t see why the bounded rationality of the addressees 
would stymie FW’s program if the legal scholars themselves were unboundedly rational. 
 
 In short, it is the bounded rationality of legal scholars -- not citizens and officials 
--- that poses a grave difficulty for FW’s welfarist program for legal scholarship.41    
                                                 
39 To be sure, some of the simplifications have been dropped in subsequent optimal tax work, but 
subsequent work still contains many simplifications that would not characterize scholarship by unbounded 
scholars. For a survey of subsequent work, see Tuomala, Optimal Income Tax. 
40 There is a different and larger question here, about whether DT can be used for “strategic” rather than 
“parametric” choice -- where the effects of the decisionmaker’s choices depend on other actors who are 
themselves choosing with reference to the decisionmaker’s choices.  I believe the answer is “yes,” but 
cannot pursue the point here. 
41 It might be objected that FW is arbitrary to address its recommendations just to legal scholars.  
Welfarism is either the right moral framework for everyone or for no one.  Still, the point remains that the 
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 What are the possible responses to this difficulty?  One response, of course, is to 
reject FW’s welfarist program for legal scholarship.  But this is trickier than it sounds.  
Much of the criticism of FW involves its rejection of fairness criteria.  If this indeed is a 
deficiency in FW, and we correct it by adopting a pluralist program -- recommending that 
legal scholars evaluate policies with respect to both social welfare and some set of 
fairness criteria -- the problem of bounded rationality remains (at least) with respect to 
the welfarist part of this program.  A different response is to adopt a wholly non-welfarist 
framework, which enjoins legal scholars to focus solely on fairness criteria, or other 
nonwelfarist considerations, and ignore overall well-being or the distribution of well-
being.   Such a framework might be easier to square with legal scholars’ cognitive limits, 
but it would be normatively unattractive: social welfare is surely one significant part of 
the moral landscape.   Finally, we might return to the traditional criteria adopted by law-
and-economics: wealth maximization or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.   But these criteria are 
much less attractive (on their own, or as part of a pluralistic framework) than social 
welfare as FW understands it.  And, in any event, cost-benefit analysis -- the traditional 
technique for implementing wealth-maximization or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency -- faces 
exactly the same problems of explaining how to simplify action, state, and outcome sets 
that the application of a social welfare function does.42 
 
 Nor will the problem be solved by shifting away from FW’s preferentialist theory 
of well-being.  What compounds the problem of bounded rationality is not 
preferentialism but multidimensionality.  Any theory which recognizes multiple sources 
of well-being (be it multiple objective goods, multiple kinds of good mental states, or the 
multiple things people prefer), and cares about the well-being of many people, will tend 
to generate a particularly large fully specified outcome set. 
  
 A different response is to endorse welfarist goals for legal scholars (either solo, or 
as part of a larger pluralist program), but to adopt one of the possible solutions to the 
problem of bounded rationality discussed in Part II.  I have criticized those solutions 
already, and will not repeat the criticism here.   
 
 Yet another response is to point to the collective nature of legal scholarship.  One 
might say, “Each legal scholar should try to identify laws and policies that maximize 
social welfare.  But, in doing so, each scholar should coordinate with other scholars, 
rather than acting as if she were the sole researcher pursuing the welfare-maximization 
goal.”  This leads us into the murky waters of rule-consequentialist revisions to DT.  
Rather than asking which policy she should investigate, so as to maximize one or another 
social welfare function, the scholar might ask something like the following: what rule for 
the community of scholars, if followed by everyone in the community, would maximize 
that social welfare function?  But, whatever the attractions of rule consequentialism, it 
does not seem a fruitful solution to the problem of bounded rationality.  There is a large 
                                                                                                                                                 
viability of FW, qua methodology for legal scholarship, is chiefly threatened by the cognitive limitations of 
legal scholars. 
42 See Adler & Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis, pp. 68-73. 
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set of possible rules to structure the community’s research that might be followed, each to 
be evaluated in light of a large set of outcomes and states. 
 
 Finally, it might be pointed out some legal scholars are engaged in 
nonprescriptive scholarship.  They aim, not to recommend laws and policies to 
government officials, but simply to describe and explain how individuals behave 
(specifically, to understand how individuals respond to legal rules). 
 
 There is a clear sense in which descriptive/explanatory legal scholarship does not 
need an account of bounded rationality.  Imagine that, as a descriptive/explanatory 
scholar, I believe that human behavior in some domain is produced by some 
computationally cheap heuristic such as those identified by Tversky and Kahneman or 
Gigerenzer: availability, representativeness, anchoring and adjustment, Take the Best, 
and so forth.  I need not take a position about whether this behavior is rational.43   My 
aim is not to endorse or criticize the behavior, but to explain it.  The heuristic, I claim, 
does so.  Why do I need to take a position on whether compliance with the heuristic is 
normatively appropriate? 
 
 A harder question is whether legal scholars engaged in descriptive/explanatory 
scholarship confront the problem of bounded rationality in structuring their own research 
activities.  Will any methodology for nonprescriptive legal scholarship be stymied by the 
cognitive limitations of legal scholars?   Any such methodology will give guidance to 
legal scholars in deciding which questions about human behavior to investigate.  Odd as 
it may sound, one such methodology -- at least in principle -- is welfarist.  That 
methodology tells scholars to pursue those research projects into human behavior that 
have the greatest expected positive impact on social welfare -- in virtue of the 
information the projects might produce, the probability of producing that information, 
and the relevance of the information to well-being .44   Such a methodology would, pretty 
clearly, be hampered by scholars’ bounded rationality. However, there may be plausible 
nonwelfarist accounts of how scholars should undertake descriptive/explanatory work 
that are feasibly implemented by bounded scholars. 
 
  I will not try to address these questions about the foundations of 
descriptive/explanatory legal scholarship.  Bounded rationality may not be a gap in the 
foundations of descriptive/explanatory scholarship, but it is a large and unresolved gap in 
our understanding of how prescriptive legal scholars should conduct their activities. 
FW may be right that prescriptive legal scholarship should focus solely on identifying 
legal rules that maximize social welfare.  At a minimum, it is surely true that social 
welfare is one of the criteria that prescriptive legal scholarship should use to evaluate 
legal rules.  But we currently lack any normative handle on how cognitively limited 
scholars should undertake that analysis: on how incomplete action, state, and outcome 
sets should be structured so that the analysis is both sufficiently intensive, and yet neither 
                                                 
43 See Allan Gibbard, 2002, “Normative Explanations: Invoking Rationality to Explain Happenings,” in 
Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar, eds., Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality, pp. 265-
82. 
44Cf. Philip Kitcher, 2001, Science, Truth and Democracy, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 117-35.  
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computationally infeasible nor overly expensive, given the welfare stakes of the rules 
being evaluated. 
